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Adds an extra check to ensure the `keyId` and `actorId` included in signed requests and actor records point back to the originating host. This check prevents server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks where a carefully crafted request could be used to trick a federation server into making requests to arbitrary hosts and ports. Further refactors can make these checks more robust, but would better fit after other existing refactor PRs are merged. Related: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/11779 ### Tests for Go changes - I added test coverage for Go changes... - [x] in their respective `*_test.go` for unit tests. - [x] in the `tests/integration` directory if it involves interactions with a live Forgejo server. - I ran... - [x] `make pr-go` before pushing ### Documentation - [ ] I created a pull request [to the documentation](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs) to explain to Forgejo users how to use this change. - [x] I did not document these changes and I do not expect someone else to do it. ### Release notes - [ ] This change will be noticed by a Forgejo user or admin (feature, bug fix, performance, etc.). I suggest to include a release note for this change. - [x] This change is not visible to a Forgejo user or admin (refactor, dependency upgrade, etc.). I think there is no need to add a release note for this change. Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/11795 Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mfenniak@noreply.codeberg.org> |
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| .. | ||
| delivery_queue.go | ||
| error.go | ||
| federation_service.go | ||
| person_inbox_accept.go | ||
| person_inbox_create.go | ||
| person_inbox_follow.go | ||
| person_inbox_undo.go | ||
| person_service.go | ||
| repository_inbox_like.go | ||
| repository_service.go | ||
| result.go | ||
| signature_service.go | ||
| user_activity.go | ||